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Collins Solomon Jr.
1501 W. Hill Avenue
Fullerton, CA 92833

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JUL 17 2006

OFFICE OF PETITIONS

In re Application of:	:	
Collins Solomon Jr.	:	
Application No. 10/751,068	:	DECISION ON
Filed: January 5, 2004	:	PETITION UNDER
Title of Invention:	:	37 CFR 1.137(a)
ADJUSTABLE PISTON PUMP	:	

This is a decision in response to the petition under 37 CFR 1.137(b), filed February 16, 2006, to revive the above-identified application. The delay in treating this petition is regretted.

This Petition is hereby **granted**.

The above-identified application became abandoned for failure to timely and properly reply to the Notice of Allowance and Issue Fee Due, mailed April 1, 2005, which set a non-extendable statutory period for reply of three (3) months. Accordingly, the application became abandoned on July 2, 2005. A Notice of Abandonment was mailed on October 25, 2005.

Applicant's Assertion

Applicant asserts that the payment of the issue fee was unavoidably delayed because Applicant was hospitalized in March 2005 due to high blood pressure and excess water retention. As a result of Applicant's hospitalization, Applicant was unable to work during 2005 and worked only part time. Applicant alleges that he spent another week in the hospital in January 2006 for the same problem.

Initially it is noted that the relevant period for revival of an application based upon unavoidable delay is from the due date for the reply until the filing of a grantable petition pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(a). It is this period that applicant must demonstrate that payment of the issue fee was unavoidable.

A Grantable Petition Under 37 CFR 1.137(a)

A grantable petition to revive an abandoned application under 37 CFR 1.137(a) must be accompanied by: (1) the required reply (unless previously filed), which may met by the filing of a notice of appeal and the requisite fee; a continuing application; an amendment or request for reconsideration which *prima facie* places the application in condition for allowance, or a first or second submission under 37 CFR 1.129(a) if the application has been pending for at least two years as of June 8, 1995, taking into account any reference made in such application to any earlier filed application under 35 USC 120, 121 and 365(c); (2) the petition fee as set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(1); (3) a showing to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that the entire delay in filing the required reply from the due date for the reply until the filing of a grantable petition pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(a) was unavoidable; and (4) any terminal disclaimer (and fee as set forth in 37 CFR 1.20(d)) required pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(c).

Applicant lacks item (3) above. In order for the petition under 37 CFR 1.137(a) to be considered grantable, Applicant must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that the entire delay in filing the required reply from the due date for the reply until the filing of a grantable petition pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(a) was unavoidable. In this instance, the relevant period is between July 2, 2005, and continues to run "until the filing of a grantable petition". In order to determine whether the delay was unavoidable, the courts have adopted a "reasonably prudent person" standard. The courts have provided that:

[t]he word 'unavoidable' . . . is applicable to ordinary human affairs, and requires no more or greater care or diligence than is generally used and observed by prudent and careful men in relation to their most important business. It permits them in the exercise of this care to rely upon the ordinary and trustworthy agencies of mail and telegraph, worthy and reliable employees, and such other means and instrumentalities as are usually employed in such important business. If unexpectedly, or through the unforeseen fault or imperfection of these agencies and instrumentalities, there occurs a failure, it may properly be said to be unavoidable, all other conditions of promptness in its rectification being present.

In re Mattullath, 38 App. D.C. 497, 514-15 (1912) (quoting Ex parte Pratt, 1887 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 31, 32-33 (1887)); see also

Winkler v. Ladd, 221 F. Supp. 550, 552, 138 USPQ 666, 167-68 (D.D.C. 1963), aff'd, 143 USPQ 172 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Ex parte Henrich, 1913 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 139, 141 (1913). In addition, decisions on revival are made on a "case-by-case basis, taking all the facts and circumstances into account." Smith v. Mossinghoff, 671 F.2d 533, 538, 213 USPQ 977, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Finally, a petition cannot be granted where a petitioner has failed to meet his or her burden of establishing that the delay was "unavoidable." Haines v. Quigg, 673 F. Supp. 314, 316-17, 5 USPQ2d 1130, 1131-32 (N.D. Ind. 1987).

"The critical phrase 'unless it be shown to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that such delay was unavoidable' has remained unchanged since first enacted in 1861." Smith v. Mossinghoff, 671 F.2d 533, 538, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The standard for "unavoidable" delay for reinstating a patent is the same as the unavoidable standard for reviving an application. See Ray v. Lehman, 55 F.3d 606, 608-609, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1786, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing In re patent No. 4,409,763, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1798, 1800 (Comm'r Pat. 1990; Smith v. Mossinghoff, 671 F.2d 533, 538, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). The court in In re Mattullath, accepted the standard which had been proposed by Commissioner Hall which "requires no more or greater care or diligence than is generally used and observed by prudent and careful men in relation to their most important business." In re Mattullath, 38 App. D.C. 497, 514-515 (1912) (quoting Ex parte Pratt, 1887 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 31, 32-33 (1887)). However, "The question of whether an applicant's delay in prosecuting an application was unavoidable [will] be decided on a case-by-case basis, taking all of the facts and circumstances into account."¹ Nonawareness of the content of, or a misunderstanding of, PTO statutes, PTO rules, the MPEP, or Official Gazette notices, does not constitute unavoidable delay.² The statute requires a "showing"

¹ Smith v. Mossinghoff, 671 F.2d 533, 538, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 977 (1982).

² See Smith v. Mossinghoff, 671 F.2d 533, 538, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 977 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (citing Potter v. Dann, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 574 (D. D.C. 1978) for the proposition that counsel's nonawareness of PTO rules does not constitute "unavoidable" delay)); Vincent v. Mossinghoff, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23119, 13, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 621 (D. D.C. 1985) (Plaintiffs, through their counsel's actions, **or their own**, must be held responsible for having noted the MPEP section and Official Gazette notices expressly stating that the certified mailing procedures outlined in 37 CFR 1.8(a) do not apply to continuation applications.) (Emphasis added).

by petitioner. Therefore, petitioner has the burden of proof. The decision will be based solely on the written, administrative record in existence. It is not enough that the delay was unavoidable; petitioner must prove that the delay was unavoidable. A petition will not be granted if petitioner provides insufficient evidence to "show" that the delay was unavoidable.

Analysis

Applicant has not provided an adequate showing of unavoidable delay. Applicant asserts that the delay in paying the maintenance fee was unavoidable because the Applicant was ill and unable to work, except part-time work.

Applicant is advised that a showing of "unavoidable" delay based upon illness, hospitalization and financial difficulty must establish that Applicant was ill, hospitalized, and lacked the financial resources to pay the patent fee(s) necessary to continue prosecution of the above-identified application during the relevant time period. Such a showing must be supported by a **complete and thorough** showing of the responsible person's medical history and financial condition during the entire period between July 2, 2005 through the time the instant petition was filed, including medical records, bank records, income (tax records), expenses, assets, credit and obligations, which made the delay in payment of the application issue fee(s) unavoidable. Applicant should provide copies of all documents or records that would confirm the financial difficulty.

Applicant is advised that information provided may become public. Applicant is advised to take precautionary measures, to include redacting personal sensitive information such as social security numbers and account numbers prior to submitting the information to this Office.

Alternative venue

Applicant is strongly urged to file a petition stating that the delay was unintentional. Public Law 97-247, § 3, 96 Stat. 317 (1982), which revised patent and trademark fees, amended 35 U.S.C. § 41(a)(7) to provide for the revival of an "unintentionally" abandoned application without a showing that the delay in was "unavoidable." An "unintentional" petition under 37 CFR 1.137(b) must be accompanied by the required fee, currently \$750.00.

The filing of a petition under 37 CFR 1.137(b) cannot be intentionally delayed and therefore must be filed promptly. A person seeking revival due to unintentional delay can not make a statement that the delay was unintentional unless the entire delay, including the delay from the date it was discovered that the application was abandoned until the filing of the petition to revive under 37 CFR 1.137(b), was unintentional. A statement that the delay was unintentional is not appropriate if petitioner intentionally delayed the filing of a petition for revive under 37 CFR 1.137(b).


Further correspondence with respect to this matter should be addressed as follows:

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Telephone inquiries concerning this matter should be directed to the undersigned at (571) 272-3232.


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